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 ABSTRACT 
Policy advocates argue the case for the transformation of non-government Microfinance 
Organizations (MFOs) into shareholder owned firms. The argument is that this will bring 
about superior performance. This paper investigates whether the superiority of shareholder 
owned MFOs is empirically supported. The findings indicate that the difference between 
shareholder owned MFOs and non-government MFOs is minimal. Our results contradict 
established paradigms and policy guidelines in the industry. However, the results are not 
necessarily surprising since ownership theories do not predict a clear preference for one type 
of ownership in the microfinance market. Furthermore, findings in general banking markets as 
well as the pro-poor banking history indicate that mutual and non-profit ownership can 
compete successfully with investor ownership. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
Does the type of ownership a Microfinance Organization (MFO) has make a difference to its 
performance? Since Prodem in Bolivia was transformed into Banco Sol in 1992, it has been 
argued that an evolutionary organizational process that transforms non-government MFOs 
into shareholder owned firms (SHFs) is required (Pischke, 1996). Accounts of successful 
transformations have been shared (Fernando, 2004), and guidelines on how to transform have 
been published (Ledgerwood and White, 2006, White and Campion, 2002). The arguments 
are that SHFs can be regulated by banking authorities, accept deposits, provide a larger range 
of better quality services, be independent from donors, attract private equity capital and 
benefit from superior corporate governance because they are privately owned. The claim is 
clear; SHFs perform better than NGOs. Nevertheless, the issue of transformation has so far 
created more discussion than action. Of the thousands of NGOs, only about 43 have 
transformed into SHFs (Hishigsuren, 2006). Now is the time to test the assumed superiority of 
SHFs compared to NGOs in microfinance markets. Does the type of ownership matter? 
 
A priori, one would consider that SHFs are more profit oriented than NGOs. Similarly, that 
NGOs should care more about reaching the poorest clients than SHFs. This view is put 
forward by several policy advocates and illustrated in Rock et al (1998). However, more than 
a decade ago Dichter (1996) observed (and disliked) the fact that many NGOs in microfinance 
were driven by the same economic rationalism as profit-oriented banks. Furthermore, not all 
SHFs are in the microfinance business for profit. They may have a social mission equivalent 
to NGOs. These two factors suggest that the claimed performance difference between 
ownership types is not as clear cut as assumed. 
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Performance in microfinance markets is multidimensional. To allow a comparison of NGOs 
and SHFs we use Schreiner’s (2002) highly conceptual terms to discuss the performance of 
MFOs. Schreiner’s framework is also used by USAID when evaluating MFOs’ performance 
(Woller, 2006). In his framework Schreiner proposes six aspects of social benefits for 
microfinance clients. The six aspects can all be considered performance dimensions in a 
MFO. The six dimensions are: cost, depth, breadth, length, scope and worth, where Cost is 
defined as the sum of monetary costs and transaction costs to clients, Depth is defined as 
clients’ poverty level or other social preferences like for instance the percentage of women 
reached, Breadth is defined as the number of clients served, Length is defined as the time 
frame of the supply of services and Scope is defined as number of types of financial contracts 
supplied. Worth estimates to what the degree the clients value the services. Worth is omitted 
from our discussion since it is subjective and according to Schreiner the most difficult to 
define and measure. Schreiner’s (2002) underlying assumption is that more socially oriented 
MFOs can trade-off narrow breadth, short length and limited scope with greater depth, while 
less socially oriented MFOs compensate shallow depth with wide breadth, long length and 
ample scope. Rock et al. (1998) identify more socially oriented MFOs with NGOs, and the 
less socially oriented MFOs with SHFs. 
 
We outline ownership theories and hypotheses before we test for the argued differences 
between the SHF and the NGO in three ways. Firstly, the average of empirical specifications 
of the five dimensions of performance are compared and tested for significant differences. 
Then, the specified dimensions are used to predict the organisational type of either NGO or 
SHF in multivariate logit regressions. Lastly, we test the results for robustness using adjusted 
values instead of the original variables. 
 
 4
A dataset with high-quality information from 200 non-government or shareholder MFOs in 54 
countries is used to carry out the statistical tests. The organisations share a willingness to open 
their accounts to careful scrutiny by third party rating agencies and to make their reports 
public. The organisations thus represent the more commercial oriented strata of MFOs. 
 
The findings indicate that the difference in performance between SHFs and NGOs is minimal. 
NGOs are not more socially oriented than SHFs, nor are SHFs more profit oriented than 
NGOs. SHFs’ superiority in scale and scope do not seem to be related to ownership type, but 
to the legal constraints which impede most NGOs from mobilizing savings.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section two introduces microfinance policies 
and ownership theories. Section three outlines the hypothesis and identifies statistical 
measurements. Information about our dataset is provided in section four. In section five the 
findings are presented and discussed. Section six concludes. 
 
MICROFINANCE POLICIES AND OWNERSHIP THEORIES 
A review of microfinance policy reports reveals that most of them highlight the strengths of 
SHFs and the weaknesses of NGOs. In particular, they emphasis that NGOs are less 
commercial and professional because they lack owners with the pecuniary incentive to 
monitor management (Berenbach and Churchill, 1997, C-GAP, 2003, Chavez and Gonzalez-
Vega, 1994, Christen and Rosenberg, 2000, Greuning et al., 1998, Hardy et al., 2003, Jansson 
et al., 2004, Staschen, 1999). The implicit message is that SHFs benefit from better 
governance, can access more funding and thus perform better than NGOs.  
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However, an alternative hypothesis may be that SHFs and NGOs do not perform differently, 
because they may use the same business model to compete and serve customers in the 
microfinance market. In fact, different ownership forms are common in the banking and 
insurance industries (Mayers and Smith, 1983, Hansmann, 1996). In mature bank-markets 
where different ownership types co-exist, researchers find little evidence to suggest that 
ownership type influences operational efficiency (Altunbas et al., 2001, Crespi et al., 2004, 
ESBG, 2004). In a recent large European study  Iannotta et al. (2007) found that investor 
owned banks have higher profitability, but have higher operating costs than non-investor 
owned banks. In historic terms pro-poor banking has generally been dominated by mutual and 
non-profit ownership, not by investor ownership (Cull et al., 2006, Hansmann, 1996). The 
question remains; why do policy makers advocate a shareholder charter for MFOs? 
 
Ownership theories 
Most research on the effect of ownership on firm performance is rooted in agency theory 
indicating that there are agency costs stemming from the separation of ownership and control 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Fama and Jensen, 1983). These costs can be minimized 
depending on how ownership is organized and practised. According to this theory, owners 
with pecuniary incentives are more able to reduce agency costs. The implicit conclusion is 
that in ownerless non-profit organizations like NGOs, agency costs are higher. However, 
agency theory also predicts that the non-profit organizations can have an offsetting benefit of 
reducing customer adverse selection and moral hazard (Hansmann, 1996, Desrochers and 
Fischer, 2002), since they may be closer to the customers and better able to tap into local 
information networks. In microfinance where customers generally have lower levels of 
education, it makes good sense that Macey and O’Hara ((2003) suggest that the relationships 
with depositors and borrowers are as important to the success of the bank as the manager’s 
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and the board’s relationship with its owners. Furthermore, in microfinance where donors are 
major stakeholders, the principal-agent relationship can equally be applied to the relationship 
between the MFO and the donor. Donors may have more problems entrusting their money to 
MFOs owned by profit motivated investors. Therefore, agency costs in microfinance have a 
multiple nature, one between owners and managers, one between the MFO and its customers, 
and one between the donors and the MFO. 
 
The theory of ownership of enterprise framed by Hansmann (1996) further develops the 
agency theory in relation to ownership. According to Hansmann, different costs occur 
depending on who owns an enterprise. Hansmann argues that costs stem from market based 
contracts between the enterprise and its stakeholders like employees, customers, donors, debt 
holders, and from the practice of ownership between management and the owners as well as 
between the owners themselves. The argument is that these ownership-costs can be minimized 
depending on how the ownership is organized. From the theory it can be derived that due to 
owners’ pecuniary incentives, investor owned firms minimize ownership costs stemming from 
the practice of ownership compared to NGOs. However, compared with SHFs, NGOs are 
better at mitigating the costs stemming from the market contracts. Hence, according to 
Hansmann (1996) co-operative and non-profit enterprises can operate successfully in more 
imperfect markets like those where most MFOs operate. 
 
The fact that most equity holders in SHFs are NGOs, donors or socially oriented investors 
(Ivatury and Abrams, 2005, Ivatury and Reille, 2004, Goodman, 2005) indicates that the type 
of ownership probably matters less in microfinance than in other industries. However, certain 
stakeholders such as banking authorities, some debt holders, depositors and some profit-
focused investors are often unique for SHFs. Furthermore, the fact that shareholders are free 
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to sell their shares and that several of today’s equity holders have a limited time horizon to 
their investments, indicates that managers of SHFs experience a different type of ownership 
control than may occur in NGOs. 
 
In summary, we observe that the theories do not bring clear predictions regarding the 
efficiency of different ownership types in microfinance markets. However, the lack of clear 
prediction can be interpreted as theoretical support for the existence of the multiple ownership 
types that we observe in the microfinance markets as well as in regular banking markets.  
 
Microfinance studies on ownership and performance 
The literature on the performance of MFOs has generally not been concerned with the effect 
of ownership type. However, Hartarska (2005) in her study on corporate governance in East 
European MFOs included ownership type as an independent variable in her model. Similarly 
Cull et al. (2007) included ownership type as a control variable in their study on the influence 
of lending methodologies on performance. In none of the studies ownership type had a 
significant influence on the performance of MFOs.  In another study Hartarska and 
Nadolnyak (2007) found that regulation did not affect either social nor financial performance 
in MFOs. Since most countries don’t allow NGOs to become regulated, the Hartarska and 
Nadolnyak study is of particular relevance for this study. 
 
HYPOTHESIS AND MEASUREMENTS 
As outlined in the former section, ownership theories do not provide clear prediction 
regarding preferred ownership type in microfinance markets. However, Schreiner (2002) 
assumes that more socially oriented MFOs trade off narrow breadth, short length and limited 
scope with greater depth, while less socially oriented MFOs trade off shallow depth with wide 
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breadth, long length and ample scope. Assuming the NGOs involved in microfinance to be 
generally more socially oriented than SHFs, as indicated in several policy reports and 
illustrated in Rock et al. (1998), we derive our main hypothesis:  
 
Main Hypothesis 
NGOs are more socially oriented than SHFs. 
 
If NGOs are more socially oriented than SHFs, they should have greater depth, shorter length, 
narrower breadth and more limited scope than SHFs. Regarding differences in costs, the 
Schreiner (2002) framework does not provide prediction.  
 
We identify measurements able to explain each of the five selected dimensions. We recognize 
that no single measurement or simple combination of measurements is able to fully explain 
the completeness of any of the five selected performance dimensions. Alongside the 
identification of the measurements, we indicate expected performance differences between 
NGOs and SHFs. When not otherwise indicated, ratio definitions are from Microrate and 
IADB (2002). 
 
1) Costs to clients 
Cost to clients is the sum of monetary costs and transaction costs. We omit transaction costs 
and concentrate on monetary costs to the clients which become revenue for the MFO. The 
revenue ratio including most, but not necessarily all, monetary costs to clients is the income 
yield. In an MFO, the income yield is a function of debt costs, operational costs, loan loss 
costs and equity costs. We identify measurements for each as follows: 
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Debt Costs 
We use the cost of funds ratio as a measure together with the debt/equity ratio. However, 
because some firms have negative ratios due to negative equity, we also include the 
debt/assets measure. Due to legal constraints restricting most NGOs to intermediate deposits 
as well as the general policy preference in the industry for SHFs, we expect debt costs to be 
higher in NGOs than in SHFs.  
 
Operational Costs 
We employ the operating expense ratio as a measure. Implicit in the policy recommendations 
is that owners with pecuniary incentives are better able to induce efficient operations. Thus, 
we expect operational costs to be higher in NGOs than in SHFs. 
 
Loan Losses 
In accounting reports, loan losses can be found as write-offs and portfolio at risk and it is the 
combination of the two which ultimately informs us of the loan losses. Less ownership control 
indicates that NGOs lack some incentives to follow-up defaulters. At the same time, NGOs, 
due to their social mission, should be more inclined to accept clients’ reasons for defaulting. 
Yet, for profit-motivated organisations, there can sometimes be a trade-off between slightly 
increased loan losses and reduced operational costs. Nevertheless, we expect loan losses to be 
higher in NGOs than in SHFs. 
 
Equity Costs 
Equity cost is measured as return on equity (ROE). Equity costs are influenced by managers’ 
interest in securing their own future and reputation, but also depend on the owners’ pecuniary 
incentives. Other factors constant, equity costs should be higher in SHFs than in NGOs.  
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 2) Depth 
Depth is defined as clients’ poverty level or other social preferences such as the percentage of 
women reached. An imperfect, but useful and much used proxy for measuring poverty levels 
among clients is average outstanding loan per client. The percentage of women reached is 
measured as the percentage of the outstanding portfolio lent to women and as a dummy 
variable indicating whether the MFO practices a conscious gender bias or not. We expect the 
NGOs to reach poorer clients and relatively more women than the SHFs. 
 
3) Breadth 
Breadth of outreach is the number of clients served. Clients can be both savings clients and 
loan (credit) clients. Since NGOs in most cases cannot mobilize deposits due to legal 
constraints, their number of savings clients should in most cases be zero. Excluded from the 
opportunity to fund loans with savings, together with the difficulty in accessing debt indicate 
that the number of credit clients as well as the total number of clients should be lower in 
NGOs than in SHFs. 
 
4) Length 
Length of outreach is the time frame of the supply of microfinance. Length is difficult to 
measure, but profit is a proxy because it signals the ability to sustain the business over time. 
Since SHFs should have the benefit of lower costs and larger scale, they should be able to 
enjoy higher profitability and sustain longer than NGOs. Due to considerable variation in 
debt/equity ratios, profit in the microfinance industry is best measured as ROA and not the 
ROE.  
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5) Scope of outreach 
Scope of outreach is the number of types of financial contracts supplied. Since the 
mobilization of deposits is generally reserved for regulated entities, NGOs should, due to the 
difficulty of becoming regulated, generally not offer voluntary savings. When it comes to the 
number of credit products being supplied, NGOs are also disadvantaged due to the lack of 
scale and resources. 
 
In summary, the Schreiner (2002) model implies that NGOs trade off more depth with less 
breadth, length and scope compared to SHFs. We investigate this by comparing average 
specifications of the five outreach dimensions in table 2 and 3 for the subgroups of SHF and 
NGO. Furthermore, if the SHF and NGO differ in dimensions of performance, we should be 
able to predict organisational type from these performance dimensions. In particular, depth 
should be an important prediction variable. We study this in a simple logit model where the 
dummy variable “ownership type” is the binary dependent variable containing the SHF and 
the NGO types.  
 
Definitions of variables used in the analysis are given in table 1. 
 
Table 1 
 
DATASET 
The dataset has been constructed using rating reports made public at the www.ratingfund.org. 
Reports made by the following five rating agencies are included: MicroRate, Microfinanza, 
Planet Rating, Crisil and M-Cril. The methodologies applied by the rating agencies have been 
compared and no major differences in how they assess MFOs have been found. All the five 
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agencies are approved official rating agencies by the Rating Fund of the Consultative Group 
to Assist the Poor (C-GAP) (www.ratingfund.org).  
 
The fact that MFOs in the sample are rated means a certain selection bias in that the data is 
skewed towards the better performing MFOs. However, this is an advantage in our 
comparative analysis since much background “noise” like very small MFOs or development 
programmes without the intention to apply microfinance in a business-like manner have been 
filtered out. This allows for more realistic comparisons of ownership types. Of the rated 
MFOs, most rating categories are represented in the data. On a uniform rating scale from 0-
100%, the average rating grade is 52.8% with a standard deviation of 17.8%. 
 
The rating reports making up the database are from 2000 to 2006 with the vast majority being 
from the last three years. The rating reports contain financial information for up to four years. 
The year the rating took place is reported as year 0, while the previous years are reported as 
year – 1, year -2 and year -3. As required, all numbers in the dataset have been annualized and 
converted to US$s using prevailing official exchange rates. The rating agencies differ in the 
information they make available in the reports. Thus, a different N on different variables and 
in different years is reported. 
  
The dataset consists of 132 NGOs and 68 SHFs. Of the SHFs, 13 are banks and 55 are non-
bank financial institutions (NBFIs). Both banks and NBFIs are usually, but not always, 
regulated by local banking authorities and allowed to intermediate some kinds of public 
deposits.  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
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Trade-offs in outreach? 
With the specifications suggested in table 1, tables 2 and 3 show the averages of the five 
dimensions, while an ANOVA F test gives the significance level of the difference between the 
two group means. In each year, the extreme values for the debt/equity ratio have been filtered 
out, that is, cases with values above 20 and below zero are removed. Note that the dataset 
only contains data from year 0 on Conscious gender bias, the Women percentage and number 
of Loan products. Thus, these are only reported in year 0. 
 
Tables 2 and 3  
 
Comments are made on all years together. The depth variables are the Average loan amount, 
the Conscious gender bias, and the Women percentage. Thus, if the depth is higher in NGOs, 
we expect to find a lower Average loan amount and higher values on the gender variables. We 
found a significant difference in the Conscious gender bias variable, but when it comes to 
Average loan amount and Women percentage, the expressed bias does not show up in 
practice. Note that N differs considerably between these two variables. The fraction of loans 
provided to women is surprisingly high in SHFs, about two thirds. Thus, the depth hypothesis 
is not supported. 
 
Do we find the trade-offs with other dimensions? We found significant differences in debt 
costs. The debt/equity ratio is significantly higher in SHFs than in NGOs in all years. 
Likewise, the scope is lower in NGOs. We found significant differences in Voluntary Savings 
as well as in the number of Loan products. The differences are as predicted in our hypothesis. 
For the breadth dimension, we found significant differences for all clients, but for credit 
clients only for years -2 and -3. Probably, we need to consider the debt cost, breadth and 
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scope together. Since NGOs are normally not regulated, they cannot accept deposits. This 
institutional aspect may explain the significant differences on the variables. Without access to 
deposits, NGOs have a smaller capital base to fund lending. Therefore we expect both the 
debt/equity ratio and the voluntary savings to be lower in NGOs. 
 
On the other hand, we find some interesting similarities. For instance, the operating expense 
ratio is not significantly different in any year, and the ratio is in fact lower in SHFs only for 
the two most recent years. Thus, we cannot say that SHFs are managed in a more cost-
effective manner than NGOs. A second similarity concerns equity costs, specified as ROE. 
These shows no significant difference in any year, and are lower in year -3 in SHFs. 
Furthermore, the length dimension, specified as ROA, is consistently higher in NGOs than in 
SHFs. But again, the differences are too small to be significant. However, the hypothesis was 
the reverse of what we found. Thus, it seems like the NGO does not sacrifice business 
opportunities in order to supply credit to poor clients. Perhaps, as a supplier with fewer 
products, it benefits from specialization. 
 
Do these differences together confirm the trade-off hypothesis? No. The significant 
differences seem to conform more to the way the SHF and the NGO are regulated. Since most 
NGOs are not regulated by banking authorities, they cannot offer services to depositors. This 
is in line with Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) who find that regulation per se does not affect 
the sustainability or outreach of the MFO, but it can have an indirect benefit if this is the only 
way for a MFO to access savings and thereby access funding. 
 
If our hypothesis derived from Schreiner’s framework is correct, we would expect to see 
significant differences between the ownership types especially for depth.  Yet, we find such a 
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difference only for the intention of serving women, but this did not transform into a higher 
female share of loans or smaller loans from the NGO. Otherwise, the similarities between the 
two ownership groups indicate that both have found a sustainable business model for the 
microfinance market. 
 
Predicting ownership type 
We now test our hypothesis by considering performance dimensions simultaneously in logit 
regressions. While the comparisons of means are a partial analysis, the effects may show up 
more explicitly when all dimensions are considered together.  
 
In table 4 we report results from logit regressions. The SHF and the NGO constitute the 
binary dependent variable ownership type. Since SHF is coded 0 and the NGO 1, a positive 
sign indicates a higher probability for detecting the NGO, a negative sign will pick out the 
SHF. Thus, from our hypothesis derived from Schreiner’s framework, we expect the depth to 
show a positive relationship to ownership type, while the other dimensions should show 
negative signs. Specifically, the ROA should be negative.  
 
For the regressions, we have included only those variables that are continuous. These 
correspond to those variables for which we have observations for each year. For each 
dimension, we have also restricted the inclusion of variables to only one, except for the cost 
dimension, where from table 1 we have several sub-groups. In these regressions, there are no 
control variables. Later, we perform robustness tests to check the results. Table 4 gives 
estimates for ownership type when debt cost is gauged as the debt level. 
 
Table 4 
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 The omnibus  test is a Wald test for the null hypothesis that all coefficients in the 
equation are zero. We can reject this hypothesis in all specifications. The Nagelkerke 
)8(2χ
2R  
measure shows how much is explained. This measure gives values that are usually much 
smaller than those in linear regression models. Therefore, the statistic shows satisfactory 
results. Also, the percentage of cases correctly classified indicates that the overall regression 
performs well. Hence, the power of our statistical model is strong. 
 
Table 4 shows that our measure of depth, average loan amount, is not significant in any 
regressions. Overall, few significant results are obtained, indicating that it is difficult to pick 
out the type of ownership from the Schreiner (2002) dimensions. The negative debt level 
(year -3) and the positive operating portfolio expense ratio (years 0 to -2) have the correct 
signs according to our hypothesis. So do the results for PaR30. But the ROA (length 
dimension) is positive and significant in year -1. This is contrary to the hypothesis. Thus, 
although costs and risk are higher in the NGO, this type of organisation has developed a 
business model that has an ROA equivalent to or better than the SHF. This indicates that 
contrary to the hypothesis, the NGO should be as sustainable in the long term as the SHF. 
 
Robustness checks 
Are our results upset when other specifications are used? We run robustness tests when the 
debt/equity ratio is used instead of the debt level, (see table 5), and tests when ROE and ROA 
are removed in table 6. In the table 5 regressions, the extreme values of the debt/equity ratio 
are filtered out, that is, cases with negative values and ratios higher than 20 are removed. 
 
Table 5 
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 The results from table 5 parallel those in table 4 to a large extent, although we obtain fewer 
significant coefficients. The operating portfolio expense ratio, which was important in table 4, 
is very close to significance in years -1 and -2. The depth variable, average loan amount, is 
not significant, and while the cost dimension variables, debt/equity ratio and operating 
portfolio expense ratio, are as predicted, the length variable ROA is positive and does not 
support the hypothesis. It is also interesting to note that the coefficient values are at about the 
same size level in both tables. This indicates that our results are robust. 
 
We also performed tests of the relation with ROE and ROA alternatively removed in year 0. 
The reason is that these variables may be highly correlated. However, the tests in table 6 show 
that coefficients are barely altered, indicating that our results are robust. 
 
Table 6 
 
Last, we performed several tests that are not reported. Instead of ROE and ROA, we used the 
adjusted values presented in some rating reports. Instead of the average loan amount, we 
adjusted the figure by GDP per capita. Instead of the debt level, we used the cost of funds. 
None of these tests contradict the results already found in tables 4 and 5. The reason for not 
using adjusted variables in the first place is the loss of observations. This is important, since 
statistically speaking, the number of observations is already low. The same is the case for 
control variables. But with the satisfactory robustness results, we consider these shortcomings 
of minor importance. 
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Taken together, the Schreiner (2002) dimensions are not successful in differentiating between 
ownership types. The hypothesis is rejected. NGOs are not more socially oriented than SHFs. 
 
CONCLUSION 
We have studied whether ownership type influences the performance of microfinance 
organizations. Our overall conclusion is that it doesn’t. NGOs are not more socially oriented 
than SHFs, nor are SHFs more commercial oriented than NGOs. We concur with Dichter 
(1996) when he observed that many NGOs involved in microfinance are driven by the same 
economic rationality as any other bank. We have tested the hypothesis that greater depth in 
the NGO is traded off against lower length, breath and scope of operations. We could not 
support the hypothesis in partial tests of equality of means in sub-groups of NGOs and SHFs, 
or in multi-variate logit regressions, where the dependent variable is the ownership type 
containing the NGO and the SHF. In the partial analysis, the differentiating variables are 
associated with the access to deposits, which many NGOs are denied, and in the logit 
regressions, the depth variable average loan is nowhere significant, and significant variables 
contradict the hypothesis. The overall conclusion is that our hypothesis is rejected. NGOs are 
not more socially oriented than SHFs. Instead, we believe that the NGOs in our sample have 
found a viable business model that gives NGOs sustainability. The reason is that the ROA is 
on par, or better, than in SHFs.  
 
The NGOs in our sample represent commercial and business oriented organizations willing to 
be rated by third party rating agencies. This is not representative for all NGOs in 
microfinance. Nevertheless, our empirical study does not support policy advocates’ 
preferences for SHFs. Also NGOs can be sustainable, well performing MFOs. 
Recommending NGOs to become SHFs seems to be premature. A revision of policy 
 19
guidelines is recommended. Adaptation of legal frameworks allowing well-performing NGOs 
to mobilize savings appears to be a better option than transformation, if the objective is to 
increase NGOs’ scale and scope. 
 
Our results contradict established paradigms and policy guidelines in the industry. However, 
the results are not necessarily surprising. As indicated in the theory section, ownership 
theories do not predict a clear preference for one type of ownership in the microfinance 
market. This is further supported by findings in general banking markets as well as the pro-
poor banking history, indicating that mutual and non-profit ownership can compete 
successfully with investor ownership. Furthermore, our results are in line with recent findings 
in Cull et al (2007) and Hartarska (2005). Nevertheless, we welcome more studies to confirm 
or question our findings. Furthermore, we call for studies on how to adapt legal frameworks 
so as to allow well-performing NGOs to mobilize savings. We also encourage qualitative and 
quantitative studies to compare the governance systems and their effect in SHFs and NGOs. 
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 Table 1: Variable definitions 
Variable Definitions (when available from (Microrate and IADB, 2002) 
Cost  
A Debt cost 
Cost of Funds Ratio The cost of funds at the end of a given period, that is COF = (Interests and 
fee expense on funding liabilities)/(Average funding liabilities). 
Debt/equity ratio The ratio of debt to equity at the end of a given period. 
Debt/Assets The ratio of debt to total assets. 
 
B Operational cost 
Operating expense ratio: The ratio of the operating expenses to the average loan portfolio, thus 
OER = (Operating expenses)/(Average total loan portfolio). 
C Loan losses 
Write-Off ratio The ratio of loans that has been written off and accepted as a loss, that is WOR = 
(value of loans written-off)/(average loan portfolio). 
Portfolio at Risk (PaR 30) The percentage of the total loan portfolio with more than 30 days in 
arrears. 
D Equity costs Return on Equity (ROE) 
Depth 
Average loan amount The average outstanding loan amount per loan client at the end of a given 
year, thus, ALA = (Gross outstanding portfolio)/(Number of active credit clients). 
Conscious gender bias? Does the MFO report having a conscious gender bias? 1 being yes. 
Women percentage The percentage of the clients being female or if this is not available, the 
percentage of the portfolio held by women. 
Breadth 
Total number of clients The total number of clients active with the MFO 
Number of credit clients The number of credit clients at the end of the period. 
Length Return on Assets The return on assets (ROA) at the end of a given period. 
Scope 
Total voluntary savings The clients’ total voluntary savings with the MFO as appeared in the 
balance sheet at the end of a given period and includes demand and fixed deposits. 
Loan products The number of loan products offered by the MFO. 
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Table 2: The average and standard deviation of the five dimensions of performance in 
shareholder owned firms (SHF) and non-governmental organisations (NGO), years 0 and -1 
 SHF NGO F-test 
Year 0 Mean Std N Mean Std N Sign 
Debt/Equity ratio 3,646 3,978 64 2,137 2,725 115 0,003 
Debt level 0,512 0,319 67 0,587 0,283 131 0,096 
Operating portfolio expense ratio  0,267 0,220 67 0,295 0,184 130 0,341 
Cost of Funds Ratio 0,082 0,059 57 0,081 0,087 120 0,951 
Write-Off ratio 0,013 0,017 47 0,020 0,043 98 0,318 
PaR 30 0,057 0,072 68 0,052 0,073 130 0,643 
ROE 0,119 0,235 50 0,070 0,389 109 0,407 
Average loan amount 701,230 657,560 67 562,292 699,577 130 0,179 
Conscious gender bias? 0,296 0,461 54 0,452 0,500 115 0,054 
Women percentage 0,677 0,300 19 0,758 0,237 55 0,235 
Clients 40900 98703 60 17352 24891 131 0,011 
Credit clients 25666 52383 66 16839 24775 131 0,110 
ROA 0,026 0,088 65 0,040 0,094 129 0,313 
Voluntary savings 5058490 17479664 65 26892 150334 123 0,002 
Loan products 5,138 4,391 65 3,492 2,234 128 0,001 
 SHF NGO F-test 
Year -1 Mean Std N Mean Std N Sign 
Debt/Equity ratio 3,294 3,150 54 1,673 1,700 107 0,000 
Debt level 0,526 0,308 56 0,549 0,298 121 0,648 
Operating portfolio expense ratio  0,285 0,234 54 0,320 0,206 114 0,326 
Cost of Funds Ratio 0,080 0,061 47 0,082 0,111 100 0,936 
Write-Off ratio 0,025 0,039 47 0,024 0,035 104 0,875 
PaR 30 0,064 0,080 53 0,061 0,086 112 0,827 
ROE 0,045 0,261 50 0,004 0,495 109 0,583 
Average loan amount 680,869 627,311 53 626,179 886,786 112 0,687 
Clients 27449 72211 46 12350 16945 118 0,034 
Credit clients 20450 49582 52 12200 16908 118 0,109 
ROA 0,003 0,121 52 0,032 0,115 114 0,141 
Voluntary savings 2969318 8435670 55 12893 84654 115 0,000 
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Table 3: The average and standard deviation of the five dimensions of performance in 
shareholder owned firms (SHF) and non-governmental organisations (NGO), years -2 and -3 
 SHF NGO F-test 
Year -2 Mean Std N Mean Std N Sign 
DE 2,985 2,938 52 1,583 1,894 104 0,000 
Debt level 0,485 0,339 54 0,516 0,316 113 0,556 
Operating portfolio expense ratio  0,305 0,280 51 0,334 0,238 104 0,495 
Cost of Funds Ratio 0,076 0,052 46 0,075 0,091 92 0,954 
Write-Off ratio 0,021 0,036 49 0,028 0,047 103 0,410 
PaR 30 0,064 0,089 52 0,071 0,097 109 0,633 
ROE 0,022 0,288 50 -0,086 1,282 107 0,556 
Average loan amount 709,543 633,130 39 822,469 1446,844 73 0,644 
Clients 26575 70398 46 9744 13955 116 0,015 
Credit clients 17605 41548 51 9662 13854 116 0,067 
ROA 0,000 0,106 53 0,012 0,157 111 0,604 
Voluntary savings 2052636 5150219 53 7568 53001 110 0,000 
 SHF NGO F-test 
Year -3 Mean Std N Mean Std N Sign 
DE 3,031 3,164 37 1,616 2,284 72 0,009 
Debt level 0,517 0,367 40 0,465 0,302 77 0,418 
Operating portfolio expense ratio  0,495 0,658 33 0,410 0,350 64 0,406 
Cost of Funds Ratio 0,092 0,077 32 0,078 0,066 52 0,371 
Write-Off ratio 0,015 0,021 31 0,024 0,041 73 0,263 
PaR 30 0,070 0,085 38 0,075 0,102 74 0,777 
ROE -0,101 0,688 38 0,074 0,580 72 0,160 
Average loan amount 680,869 627,311 53 626,179 886,786 112 0,687 
Clients 21495 55388 32 7073 10542 80 0,027 
Credit clients 15148 34393 37 7192 10513 78 0,063 
ROA -0,016 0,180 40 -0,002 0,165 75 0,689 
Voluntary savings 1666170 3607646 42 6679 44028 94 0,000 
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Table 4: Logit calculations of organisational predictions. Years 0 to -3 when 
the binary variable ownership type contain SHF, coded as 0, and NGO, 
coded as 1 
 Year 
 0 -1 -2 -3 
Debt level -0.612 -0.949 -1.482 -2.128* 
Operating portfolio expense ratio  3.769** 2.407* 1.868* 2.615 
PaR 30  6.793 7.935* 5.217 7.745* 
ROE -0.344 -0.455 -0.232 0.964 
Average loan amount  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Credit clients  0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ROA 3.753 6.695* 2.912 0.954 
Total voluntary savings  0.000** 0.000** 0.000 0.000 
Constant -0.260 0.246 0.996 1.201 
Observations 148 144 136 91 
Classified correctly (%) 79.1 79.2 79.4 79.1 
Omnibus Chi-sq (8) test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Nagelkerke R Square 0.399 0.377 0.369 0.449 
 
 
Table 5: Logit calculations of ownership type. Years 0 to -3 when the 
binary dependent variable ownership type contains SHF, coded as 0, and 
NGO, coded as 1. Debt/equity ratio is used instead of debt level 
 0 -1 -2 -3
DE -0.097 -0.168* -0.056 -0.021 
Operating portfolio expense ratio  3.576** 2.225 1.899 1.093 
PaR 6.642 7.815* 4.215 10.725 
ROE -0.368 -1.149 -0.265 1.244 
Average loan amount  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Credit clients  0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ROA 3.319 7.978** 2.748 0.092 
Total voluntary savings  0.000** 0.000* 0.000 0.000 
Constant -0.323 0.159 0.416 0.036 
Observations 145 142 134 82 
Classified correctly 79.3 80.0 69.4 78.0 
Omnibus Chi-sq (8) test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Nagelkerke R Square 0.402 0.393 0.351 0.430 
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Table 6: Robustness logit calculations of organisational 
predictions, varying ROE and ROA Year 0.  
Dependent All ROE ROA 
Bank-Nf-NGO variables removed removed 
Debt level -0.612 0.311 -0.854 
Operating portfolio expense ratio  3.769** 2.264* 3.753** 
Portfolio at Risk (PaR 30),  6.793 8.193* 6.303 
ROE -0.344  0.097 
Average outstanding loan amount  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Credit clients  0.000* 0.000 0.000* 
ROA 3.753 5.161**  
Total voluntary savings  0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
Constant -0.260 -0.495 0.062 
Observations 148 179 149 
Classified correctly 79.1 74.8 78.5 
Omnibus Chi-sq (8) test 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Nagelkerke R Square 0.399 0.354 0.405 
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